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2434 
PRESS EXCEPTIONALISM 
Sonja R. West 
I am very much afraid of definitions, and yet one is almost forced to 
make them.  One must take care, too, not to be inhibited by them.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Occupy Wall Street movement was one of the largest grass-
roots political demonstrations in American history.2  The protests 
raised issues about government policies and social structures that 
sparked debate nationwide.  Treatment of the demonstrators by public 
officials garnered scrutiny too,3 as did the tactics of the protestors, 
which some alleged included unlawful conduct.4 
Yet despite the high level of newsworthiness, many reporters who 
attempted to cover the protests faced significant roadblocks.  Some 
were denied access to protest sites.5  Others were arrested,6 even when 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  This article has benefited 
from feedback received following presentations at the American Association of Law Schools’ annu-
al conference, at the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, and at Emory Law School.  I owe 
a special debt of thanks to Dan Coenen and Lyrissa Lidsky.  I would also like to thank Lindsay Sain 
Jones, Savanna Nolan, Matthew Noller, and Kimberly Scott for their research assistance.  
 1 Letter from Robert Delaunay, French artist, to August Macke, German artist (1912), archived 
at http://perma.cc/W56K-RQRD. 
 2 Allison Kilkenny, Year One: Occupy Wall Street Plans Anniversary Protest of Wall Street, 
NATION (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/169823/year-one-occupy-wall 
-street-plans-anniversary-protest-wall-street, archived at http://perma.cc/ML5Q-E4LG. 
 3 See, e.g., Al Baker & Joseph Goldstein, Officer’s Pepper-Spraying of Protesters Is Under In-
vestigation, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM (Sept. 28, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2011/09/28/police-department-to-examine-pepper-spray-incident/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/W32Z-BFXK (discussing NYPD officer’s use of pepper spray on female protestors); Larry Gordon, 
UC to Pay Settlement in Davis Pepper Spray Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, http://articles 
.latimes.com/2012/sep/13/local/la-me-uc-pepper-spray-20120914, archived at http://perma.cc/D5CD 
-UQ4T (detailing settlement paid to UC Davis protestors after campus police used pepper spray on 
them). 
 4 See, e.g., Charles P. Pierce, This Cannot Be the Way Occupy Ends, ESQUIRE: POL. BLOG 
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/occupy-wall-street-violence-6575448, archived 
at http://perma.cc/48VC-ZS62 (bemoaning protestors’ “reciprocal violence” and arguing that the pro-
test “can’t end in images of bleeding cops and tossed barricades”). 
 5 Brian Stelter & Al Baker, Reporters Say Police Denied Access to Protest Site, N.Y. TIMES: 
MEDIA DECODER (Nov. 15, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/15 
/reporters-say-police-denied-access-to-protest-site, archived at http://perma.cc/5N7Z-QDKB. 
 6 See Brian Stelter, Protest Puts Coverage in Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at B1 (not-
ing that, as of November 2011, “26 reporters and photographers have been arrested at protests 
linked to the movement”); Press Release, Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, SPJ Condemns Arrests of Jour-
nalists at Occupy Protests (Nov. 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4983-ZCHN (“[A]t least six 
journalists have been arrested or detained while covering the protests . . . .”). 
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they could and did display press credentials.7  Airspace was blocked to 
prevent filming from news helicopters.8  This shabby treatment of 
journalists led to condemnation by press organizations and caused the 
United States’s ranking on the Reporters Without Borders’ Press 
Freedom Index to drop sharply, from twentieth to forty-seventh place.9 
The experiences of the reporters covering the Occupy protests re-
flect a broader reality about journalism: on a day-to-day basis, Ameri-
can journalists deal with legal uncertainties in the pursuit of news.  
There are difficulties of access to property (sometimes even public 
property),10 information,11 and government meetings.12  Journalists 
have uncertain protections against subpoenas and face frequent gov-
ernment demands that they testify about what they have learned while 
gathering news or that they reveal the identities of confidential 
sources.13  Reporters’ notes, photographs, emails, drafts, and video 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 Press Release, Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, supra note 6 (“[T]he journalists were either wearing 
press credentials or explained to police that they were reporters covering the protests.”). 
 8 See Robert Mackey, Drone Journalism Arrives, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE (Nov. 17,  
2011, 6:43 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/drone-journalism-arrives, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3M8R-M6Z8. 
 9 World Press Freedom Index 2011–2012, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf 
.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma 
.cc/C83L-YDRU (“The United States (47th) also owed its fall of 27 places to the many arrests of 
journalist [sic] covering Occupy Wall Street protests.”). 
 10 See, e.g., Mark Washburn, Observer Religion Reporter Arrested in Raleigh Protest, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, June 10, 2013, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/06/10/4098290/observer-religion 
-reporter-arrested.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D2R2-BTLA (stating that a reporter “failed to move 
away from a crowd of about 60 that was demonstrating and peacefully surrendering to arrest. . . . [He] 
was handcuffed and taken along with the arrested protesters . . . .”).  
 11 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (2012) (outlining exemptions to government’s obligation to re-
lease information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552); Response Times, 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-open 
-government-guide/federal-freedom-information-act/response-times (last visited May 10, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/444J-LJB3 (“For journalists, the nearly routine failure of agencies to pro-
vide timely access to records has triggered the need to go outside the [Freedom of Information] 
Act . . . .”).  For examples of cases rejecting journalists’ FOIA requests under the statutory exemp-
tions, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 757, 780 
(1989) (rejecting journalist’s FOIA request for FBI record of organized crime figure suspected of 
bribing congressman); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631–32, 634 n.1 (1982) (rejecting journalist’s 
FOIA request for FBI records requested by President Nixon); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 
456 U.S. 595, 596, 602–03 (1982) (rejecting newspaper’s FOIA request for Iranian nationals’ pass-
port application information); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting public interest groups’ FOIA request for information on thousands of 
foreign nationals detained during September 11 investigation). 
 12 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (listing exemptions); The Government in the Sunshine Act, RE-
PORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-open-government 
-guide/federal-open-meetings-laws/government-sunshine-act (last visited May 10, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/L28S-RXZS (“The Sunshine Act includes 10 exemptions or reasons that the gov-
ernment can refuse to open an agency meeting.”). 
 13 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(upholding contempt orders against journalists for refusing to comply with subpoena). 
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outtakes are potentially subject to search by law enforcement.14  
Members of the press also face risks of criminal or tort liability if they 
engage in undercover reporting15 or reveal leaked information.16 
The underlying problem journalists face is that they are treated by 
the law as being no different than the subjects they are covering or, 
perhaps, mere curious bystanders.17  For constitutional purposes at 
least, it is entirely irrelevant to courts whether the speakers are mem-
bers of the press or whether they are actively pursuing the news. 
To be sure, once journalists publish or broadcast a story, their 
speech — like everyone’s speech — enjoys powerful First Amendment 
protections.18  Journalists are shielded — again, as is everyone — from 
prior restraints19 and content-based censorship of their messages.20  
But when it comes to recognizing the special role of reporters as 
watchdogs and conduits of information for the citizenry as a whole, 
the Supreme Court has taken a hands-off approach. 
One of the primary reasons for this failure to distinguish between 
constitutional protections for speech and the press is the problem of 
identification.  In order to recognize unique press protections, the 
Court must figure out who or what the press is.  The Occupy protests 
again illustrate the problem.  Among the crowds at these demonstra-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b) (2012) (setting forth situations where police may seize media’s 
“documentary materials”).  But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 552–53 (1978) (rejecting 
Fourth Amendment challenge to police search of student newspaper office for photographs), super-
seded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, as recognized in Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d 531 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 15 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that journalists who lie on employment applications to gain access to private facilities or use secret 
cameras for newsgathering activities are not protected by the First Amendment and may be liable 
for trespass or other offenses).  
 16 See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, A Rare Peek into a Justice Department Leak Probe, WASH. POST, 
May 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-rare-peek-into-a-justice-department-leak 
-probe/2013/05/19/0bc473de-be5e-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html, archived at http://perma 
.cc/TSE3-N962 (discussing the criticism of the Obama Administration’s naming of Fox News re-
porter James Rosen as a “co-conspirator” in criminal activity for soliciting the leak of classified in-
formation). 
 17 See Joe Strupp, Texas Journalists: Lt. Gov’s Threat to Arrest Reporters “Worrisome,” MEDIA 
MATTERS FOR AM. (July 1, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2013/07/01/texas 
-journalists-lt-govs-threat-to-arrest-repo/194705, archived at http://perma.cc/T387-5KY9.  
 18 See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (noting that the press 
is “guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free Speech Clause”). 
 19 See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (striking prior restraint on media 
coverage of criminal trial); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) 
(striking prior restraint on publication of Pentagon Papers); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 
U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (striking prior restraint against anti-Semitic newspaper). 
 20 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (striking law 
requiring cable operators to “scramble” sexually explicit programming); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (striking law imposing fi-
nancial burden on works describing author’s crimes); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 
U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (striking content-based magazine tax). 
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tions were many people utilizing their constitutional speech rights in 
ways that might seem “press-like.”  An office worker on his way to 
lunch might see a traffic backup caused by the protestors and use his 
smartphone to tweet a message to his followers warning them to avoid 
the area.  A cable comedy show might send a “correspondent” to the 
site to interview protestors and poke fun at some of the colorful partic-
ipants.21  A newly graduated journalism student could decide to write 
an article about the protests with the hope of getting her first publica-
tion as a freelance writer.  Then there are the bloggers.  Some bloggers 
might post regularly about related issues and thus be attempting to 
gather information for their established readership whereas others 
might be offering unrelated content on an inconsistent basis to an un-
proven audience. 
This all raises some important questions: Are these speakers the 
press?  Are all of them or only some of them?  And does the difficulty 
of answering this question confine us to a reading of the First 
Amendment that gives no meaning to the Press Clause that reaches 
beyond the Speech Clause? 
This Article advances the principle of press exceptionalism — that 
there exist certain speakers who fulfill unique roles in our democracy.  
These press speakers devote time, resources, and expertise to the vital 
constitutional tasks of informing the public on newsworthy matters 
and providing a check on the government and the powerful.22  We 
must recognize these speakers in order to consider and potentially pro-
tect their specific needs.  A continuing refusal to do so, moreover, 
comes with risks.  These risks include not only a failure to fulfill the 
promises of the First Amendment, but also widespread societal costs 
arising out of reduced information flow and weakened government 
scrutiny. 
The challenge, however, is that there are also numerous other 
speakers who use their speech rights in ways that at times appear to be 
“press-like.”  I refer to these speakers as “occasional public commenta-
tors.”  Aided increasingly by advances in communication technology, 
occasional public commentators share information and ideas about 
matters of public interest to a potentially broad audience in a timely 
manner — the very activities that were once considered the exclusive 
province of the press.  Because viewing occasional public commenta-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 See, e.g., The Daily Show with John Stewart: The 99% (Comedy Central television broadcast 
Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-october-18-2011/the-99, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/R9XM-SA7W. 
 22 Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 
45–46) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (drawing on Supreme Court precedent to es-
tablish that the press fulfills two unique constitutional functions: gathering and disseminating news 
to the public and providing a check on the government and the powerful). 
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tors as press speakers comes with constitutional costs, as I explained in 
a prior article,23 it is desirable to distinguish between the two groups.  
Therefore, I seek to establish a theoretically sound and practically 
workable methodology for identifying and distinguishing these two 
types of speakers. 
Drawing on past attempts to identify the press and also using the 
Supreme Court’s recent discussion of who is and who is not a “minis-
ter” for the purposes of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment24 
as a model, I suggest that courts should take a holistic approach to 
finding the press.  This approach could include relying on the cues of 
third parties and public institutions as proxies, as well as considering 
the speaker’s track record of publication and audience to determine 
which speakers are best fulfilling the press functions.  
I develop these ideas in three parts.  Part I explores who are mem-
bers of the press for First Amendment purposes, what they do, and 
why it matters that they be identified.  Part II then considers how 
changing technology has impacted the search for the press, concluding 
that, rather than defeating the effort, it has helped to focus it and to 
alleviate concerns of elitism.  Finally, Part III combines past efforts by 
others to identify the press with insights from the Court’s recent dis-
cussion on how to determine who is a “minister” for the purposes of 
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to offer a usable begin-
ning framework in our search for the press. 
I.  IDENTIFYING THE PRESS 
The First Amendment refers separately to freedoms of “speech”25  
and “press.”26  While it is clear that all individuals — and even corpo-
rations — have speech rights, confusion over the meaning of the term 
“press” abounds.  This Part explores the relationship between the 
Speech and Press Clauses.  It then discusses how press speakers differ 
from other speakers and why it matters that we identify them. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1030–31 (2011).  De-
fining the press too broadly makes the Press Clause’s protections redundant with those of the 
Speech Clause.  Id. at 1056.  Attempting to expand the definition of the press to cover even speakers 
on the periphery, moreover, devolves to including nearly everyone as potential members of the 
press.  Such an overly broad definition is unworkable and prevents the expansion of rights to those 
performing press functions.  Id. at 1057. 
 24 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 25 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 26 Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the press . . . .”). 
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A.  The Press Clause Versus the Speech Clause 
The relative successes of the First Amendment’s expression clauses 
provide a study in contrast.  The Speech Clause has assumed the role 
of favorite child, lavished with attention by the Supreme Court.  Over 
the last century, the Court has solidified the central role of the Speech 
Clause, interpreting its protections generously in the face of ambiguity, 
confusion, and powerful countervailing interests.  Undeterred by the 
difficulty of the questions presented, the Court has found in the Speech 
Clause a First Amendment home (even if at times a limited one) for 
such dubiously valuable forms of speech as indecency,27 simulated 
child pornography,28 corporate speech,29 commercial speech,30 hate 
speech,31 animal snuff films,32 and displays of racism.33  Constitutional 
claims that were finding doors closing in other areas, meanwhile, 
found new life in the open embrace of the Speech Clause.34 
The story of the Press Clause could not be more different.  If the 
Speech Clause is the Court’s favorite child, the Press Clause has been 
the neglected one.  During the same period that the Court has devel-
oped wide-ranging protections under the Speech Clause, it has all but  
failed to notice the Press Clause’s existence, and when it has noticed, it 
has been with a mindset of skepticism and defeatism.  In the Speech 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing conviction for wearing indecent 
antidraft jacket in courthouse); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (assuming that 
indecent monologue may have been protected if not disseminated through broadcast radio). 
 28 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (striking down the law that 
banned virtual child pornography not involving actual children). 
 29 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that the government may not 
suppress corporate political speech altogether).  
 30 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570–71 (2001) (striking down certain limits 
on tobacco advertisements); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980) (setting forth four-part test for when commercial speech may be regulated). 
 31 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011) (rejecting suit against antigay group’s 
hate speech at funeral protest). 
 32 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (striking down a ban on depictions 
of animal cruelty). 
 33 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365–67 (2003) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (holding that the 
state could not ban all cross burnings); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (strik-
ing down content-based ban on cross burning). 
 34 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (holding that a 
school’s exclusion of a religious children’s club from meeting on school property was unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 387, 396–97 (1993) (holding that a school district violated the Speech Clause by denying a 
church access to school grounds because of its religious viewpoint); see also Mark W. Cordes, Reli-
gion as Speech: The Growing Role of Free Speech Jurisprudence in Protecting Religious Liberty, 38 
SW. L. REV. 235, 236 (2008) (exploring the growing strength of the Speech Clause for protecting reli-
gious liberty); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Access to Public School Facilities for Religious Expression by 
Students, Student Groups and Community Organizations: Extending the Reach of the Free Speech 
Clause, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 269, 270 (assessing the impact of recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on school districts and religious expression in schools). 
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Clause context, the Court has found almost no case too messy to un-
tangle.  In case after case, the Court has extrapolated a complex web 
of legal rules from the sparse text of the Speech Clause concerning pro-
tected and unprotected speech;35 quasi-protected speech;36 time, place, 
and manner restrictions;37 viewpoint discrimination;38 subject-matter 
discrimination;39 symbolic expression;40 and so on.  Yet the Court has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 
(1982) (holding that child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (explaining that a state may proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) 
(“[O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”); Beauharnais v. 
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances [are not] within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech . . . .”). 
 36 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (stating that the content of the 
broadcast program was “‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking’” and “content of that character is not 
entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial 
speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in 
any way.  Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.”); Bigelow v. Virgin-
ia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (“The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s newspaper 
had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First 
Amendment guarantees.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that the government 
may impose time, place, or manner restrictions that are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave ample alternative channels open for communication); 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in 
any manner that may be desired.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The gov-
ernment must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion 
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (“The First 
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” (citation omitted)). 
 39 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 329 (1988) (holding that an ordinance that prohibit-
ed displays of a signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that “tend[ed] to bring that foreign gov-
ernment into public odium or public disrepute,” id. at 316, was unconstitutional on its face because 
it was a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum and was not narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling interest); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 45 (1983) (stating that for a state to enforce “a content-based exclusion it must show that its regu-
lation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end”); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”). 
 40 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“[C]onduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[].’” (quoting Spence 
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam))); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (holding that wearing an armband with the purpose of expressing 
certain views “was closely akin to ‘pure speech,’” id. at 505, and “entitled to comprehensive protec-
tion under the First Amendment,” id. at 506). 
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found the task of applying the Press Clause to be far more intimidat-
ing, stating that it “would present practical and conceptual difficulties 
of a high order”41 and bemoaning the “long and difficult journey to 
such an uncertain destination.”42 
Why has the Court been so reluctant to breathe life into the Press 
Clause yet so willing to foster the Speech Clause?  One argument in 
favor of this restrained Press Clause approach is that while the Speech 
Clause protects speakers, the Press Clause protects technology.  The 
term “press” can, of course, refer both to those individuals who gather 
and convey news as well as to the device originally used to print text 
onto paper (the printing press).  This ambiguity has led some to argue 
that the intent of including constitutional press freedoms was to pro-
tect the latter — the printing press or its modern equivalents.43 
While an appropriately in-depth response to this argument is out-
side the scope and space constraints of this Article, I contend that 
there are reasons to be skeptical of interpreting the First Amendment’s 
reference to “the press” as referring only to the right to publish and 
disseminate one’s speech rather than as protecting a functional en-
deavor.  First, the “press” of 1789 was a technology that allowed those 
with means the ability to reach a broad audience and thereby, to per-
form crucial functions in our self-government.44  Yet what was once a 
single, overlapping endeavor of using the printing press to widely dis-
seminate viewpoints as a means of informing others and checking the 
government has since split into two concepts — mass communication 
technology and journalism.45  The understanding of the role and im-
portance of the press at the time of the Framing maps more naturally 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972). 
 42 Id. at 703. 
 43 See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect 
the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1401–02 
(2003) (“When the First Amendment was written, the ‘press’ was literally the same as the printing 
press, merely a tool that any citizen could use to speak.”); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 
GA. L. REV 309, 339 (2008) (“As originally understood, the Free Press Clause was meant to protect 
the printing press.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a 
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 463 (2012) (“[P]eople during the 
Framing era likely understood the text as fitting the press-as-technology model — as securing the 
right of every person to use communications technology, and not just securing a right belonging ex-
clusively to members of the publishing industry.”). 
 44 See Timothy E. Cook, Freeing the Presses: An Introductory Essay, in FREEING THE 
PRESSES 1, 7–8 (Timothy E. Cook ed., 2005) (stating that “there are two theoretical traditions to 
‘freedom of the press’ in United States history,” id. at 7, and noting that the “open press model was 
as much in the air as the free press approach when the First Amendment was adopted,” id. at 8). 
 45 See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1530 (2013) (discussing the difference 
between search engines and newspapers and stating “the difference, in some fundamental way, be-
tween a tool and speech — the first directly serves the user, while the second attempts to persuade 
him”).  
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onto modern journalism than it does onto the personal use of modern 
communication technology.46 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Speech Clause 
as more than merely a right to speak in a vacuum.  Rather, speech 
rights include the right to connect with an audience.47  If the Speech 
Clause protects not only a right to speak but also a right to reach and 
interact with a listener, this protection suggests that the Press Clause is 
the repository for rights beyond the mere ability of a speaker to pub-
lish and disseminate his speech. 
For purposes of this Article, therefore, I use the term “press” as re-
ferring to more than a right to use technology to publish one’s speech.  
I contend that the First Amendment’s Press Clause was designed to 
protect speakers who fulfill specific and important “press” functions 
that differ from garden-variety speech values. 
In an earlier article, moreover, I raised another theory for why the 
Court has been so favorable to speech rights while simultaneously so 
hesitant to embrace press rights.48  The Court has interpreted the 
Speech Clause through the lens of constitutional overprotection.  This 
instinct to be overinclusive with speech rights is important — it en-
sures that speakers and viewpoints are not left out of our public de-
bate.  Yet constitutional overprotection is a poor fit with the Press 
Clause.  And, paradoxically, declaring that all or most speakers are 
members of the press leads to the recognition of fewer constitutional 
press rights.49 
The Speech and Press Clauses function differently, yet they also 
complement each other.50  The Speech Clause can work in tandem 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 See, e.g., West, supra note 23, at 1035–39 (detailing how the Supreme Court’s language in-
volving the press is in line with the use of the term “press” to refer to the news media and conflicts 
with use of the term as “technology”). 
 47 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (referring to the constitutional right of 
adults “to receive [speech] and to address to one another”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speak-
er.  But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, 
to its source and to its recipients both.” (footnote omitted)); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 
(1972) (holding that speech rights include the listener’s right to “sustained, face-to-face debate, dis-
cussion and questioning”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the 
freedom of speech includes “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”).  
 48 West, supra note 23. 
 49 Id. at 1056–58; cf. Philip Hamburger, Essay, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004) (ob-
serving, with respect to religious liberty, that “an enlarged definition of any right may invite limita-
tions on the circumstances in which it is available”). 
 50 See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty 24 (Wash. Univ. 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-10-08, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MZ8J-9SRM (“The modern era has witnessed a decline in . . . the distinctiveness of 
the rights contained in the First Amendment.”).  
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with the Press Clause51 precisely because nonpress speakers can fall 
back on the many protections the Speech Clause puts in place.52  Con-
stitutional sorting always poses risks of discrimination, of course, but 
the real-world dangers of such discrimination in identifying the press 
are greatly muted because exclusion from that category does not leave 
the speaker out in the constitutional cold.  The relationship between 
the two clauses, therefore, suggests not that we should presume that 
the Speech Clause has absorbed the Press Clause, but rather that “the 
press” has a distinct — albeit confined — meaning. 
B.  The Press Is Different 
Accepting the premise that the Press Clause establishes a distinc-
tive constitutional status for those who perform certain functions in 
our democracy raises the question of how to identify those speakers.  
Many thoughtful legal observers have addressed the question of who 
constitutes “the press” for First Amendment purposes by seeking to 
frame a definition.  I, too, have used “definition” terminology frequent-
ly and, in fact, continue to do so on occasion even in this Article.  De-
spite this common reference to a “definition,” however, perhaps the 
more appropriate question is how to “identify” or “find” the press. 
“Defining” the press suggests that some neutral arbiter (such as the 
great Judge Hercules of Professor Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence53) 
is hard at work carving out boundaries and creating distinctions where 
they previously did not exist.  “Identifying” or “finding” the press, on 
the other hand, embraces practical distinctions that occur already in 
the real world.  My thesis is that there exists a naturally evolving sub-
set of speakers who fulfill unique and constitutionally valuable press 
functions.  Thus, whereas a “definition” might draw static lines, a 
“search” for these special speakers would logically change as their tools 
and methods advance.  The quest, therefore, should not be to define 
the press but rather to train our courts to recognize them in action.  
This section discusses some shared attributes of these speakers, and 
Part III considers how we might go about finding them. 
The bottom line is that press speakers are those who fulfill the 
unique constitutional functions of the press, functions the Supreme 
Court has identified — often in dicta — as gathering newsworthy in-
formation, disseminating it to the public, and serving as a check on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 See id. (explaining the modern “conflation of First Amendment rights” in which we have “the 
worst of both worlds: a neglect of the ways in which First Amendment rights fit together and com-
plement one another, and serious confusion over how each right is separately analyzed”). 
 52 West, supra note 23, at 1058–60. 
 53 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986). 
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government and powerful people.54  Occasional public commentators 
might at times serve these functions, but the press has a commitment 
to these roles that reaches far beyond sporadic or ineffective efforts. 
Compared to occasional public commentators, the press tends to 
possess distinct qualities.  The press, for example, has knowledge, of-
ten specialized knowledge, about the subject matter at issue.55  The 
press serves a gatekeeping function by making editorial decisions re-
garding what is or is not newsworthy.56  The press places news stories 
in context locally, nationally, or over time.57  The press strives to con-
vey important information in a timely manner.58  The press has ac-
countability to its audience and gives attention to professional stand-
ards59 or ethics.60  The press devotes time and money to investigating 
and reporting the news.61  It also expends significant resources defend-
ing itself against legal attacks as well as advocating for legal changes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 West, supra note 22.  For more analysis of the Supreme Court’s view of the press’s unique 
constitutional functions, see generally id. 
 55 See EDMUND B. LAMBETH, COMMITTED JOURNALISM 25–26 (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that 
reporters must become familiar with the subject areas they cover). 
 56 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“A newspaper is more 
than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising.  The choice of material to 
go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, 
and treatment of public issues and public officials — whether fair or unfair — constitute the exer-
cise of editorial control and judgment.” (footnote omitted)); David Carr, Local Papers Shine Light 
in Society’s Dark Corners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/10 
/business/media/local-papers-shine-light-in-societys-dark-corners.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/D3ZX-K7US (detailing “the importance of local journalistic vigilance” in breaking the story of 
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s office’s involvement in closing two lanes of access to the 
George Washington Bridge, which led to a multi-hour traffic jam). 
 57 See BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 43–44 (2001) 
(arguing that the press must provide context, as opposed to mere accuracy, in order to provide the au-
dience with the full “journalistic truth,” id. at 43); id. at 145 (“Unless the [journalistic] forum is based 
on a foundation of fact and context, the questions citizens ask will simply become rhetorical.”). 
 58 See Stephen Lacy et al., Citizen Journalism Web Sites Complement Newspapers, 31 NEWS-
PAPER RES. J. 34, 42 (2010), archived at http://perma.cc/4MLY-XMJP (“Only slightly more than a 
quarter of the citizen news and blog sites published the same day they were visited, which indicates 
most are not as timely as daily newspaper sites.”). 
 59 PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 146, 155 (2013) (“Before a story is 
published, every line, every quote, every judgment call is subjected to checking and rechecking, de-
bate and counter-debate, and institutional second guessing.”  Id. at 155.). 
 60 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 365 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The press 
does have the right, which is its professional function, to criticize and to advocate.  The whole gam-
ut of public affairs is the domain for fearless and critical comment, and not least the administration 
of justice.  But the public function which belongs to the press makes it an obligation of honor to ex-
ercise this function only with the fullest sense of responsibility.  Without such a lively sense of re-
sponsibility a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice.”). 
 61 Chelsea Ide & Kanupriya Vashisht, Today’s Investigative Reporters Lack Resources, 
AZCENTRAL.COM (May 28, 2006, 3:30 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special01 
/0528bolles-stateofreporting.html?&wired, archived at http://perma.cc/CT7Q-KWTX (discussing 
the amount of time and money reporters need to pursue investigative journalism). 
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that foster information flow.62  And the press has a proven ability to 
reach a broad audience through regular publication or broadcast. 
For all of these reasons, members of the press, in contrast to occa-
sional public commentators, would be best positioned to use potential 
press rights in ways that would benefit society as a whole.  Rights of 
access to places, information, and sources, for example, help the press 
inform the public and thereby check wrongdoing by powerful public 
officials, private individuals, and entities.63 
Acknowledging a distinction between the press and occasional pub-
lic commentators does not, of course, entail allowing any new re-
strictions on the rights of any individual to speak.  Occasional public 
commentators are free — and should remain free — at all times to use 
fully their constitutional speech rights.  These rights of expression are 
abundant and include the right to publish and disseminate their 
speech.  Contrary to the arguments of others, recognizing a special 
measure of constitutional protection for the press does not require em-
bracing a vision under which the press “will play an active role and 
the audience a passive one.”64 The goal is to enhance the uniquely use-
ful protections of this subset of speakers who have proven they will fur-
ther certain societal goals, not to diminish the rights of other speakers. 
Pretending that the press is no different than an army of individual 
speakers with megaphones is a dangerous road to travel.  In theory all 
citizens armed with laptops and Internet connections might be able to 
gather and convey news and check powerful government and private 
interests.  But the reality is that there are some speakers who do this 
work far more consistently and effectively than others.  And common 
sense suggests that repeat-player specialists with proven track records 
will do the most valuable work.  It is true that public commentators 
sometimes act like the press.  But it is equally true that there exist 
press speakers who operate differently and with significantly greater 
impact than a mere collection of individuals exercising their speech 
rights. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper 
America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 559 (2011) (discussing “the critical, but underappreciated, 
role that traditional media entities have played as legal instigators and enforcers”). 
 63 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role as a check 
on government abuse . . . .”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(“As private and public aggregations of power burgeon in size . . . there is obviously a continuing 
need for an independent press to disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion through 
reportage, investigation, and criticism . . . .”); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (describing the 
press as “a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corrup-
tion among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and 
occurrences”).  
 64 Adam Cohen, The Media that Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (calling this view a “common deficiency” of attempts to rescue the press). 
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C.  Why Finding the Press Matters 
Our public debate has never seemed noisier.  The marketplace of 
ideas is overloaded with a cacophony of voices from both media and 
nonmedia speakers.  Thus, thanks to our robust speech rights, it might 
appear that the courts’ inattention to the Press Clause is at most harm-
less error.  Yet allowing the Press Clause to lie dormant does matter. 
The impact is most obvious in the context of newsgathering.  De-
spite recognition that “without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,”65 the Supreme Court 
has extended to the press no protection for newsgathering.  When ana-
lyzing tort violations such as trespass, fraud, or breach of duty of loy-
alty (common issues for undercover reporting), courts do not take into 
account whether the defendant was a journalist pursuing a story.66  
Reporters, likewise, are not protected from government subpoenas to 
testify about their confidential sources, notes, or work product.67  They 
likely have no constitutional defense against having their newsrooms 
searched or their telephone records divulged.68  A journalist who re-
ceives leaked information from a source about a newsworthy matter 
might be treated as a criminal.69 
Members of the press also have unique needs for protection.  They 
have special concerns, for example, about becoming tools of the gov-
ernment or law enforcement.70  Forcing a member of the press to testi-
fy about personal observations or to reveal a confidential source to a 
grand jury brings about greater harms than compelling a nonpress in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. 
 66 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 67 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. 
 68 See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Gov’t Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (May 13, 2013, 10:53 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/govt-obtains-wide-ap-phone 
-records-probe, archived at http://perma.cc/NLM4-SHXW (“The Justice Department secretly ob-
tained two months of telephone records of reporters and editors for The Associated Press in what 
the news cooperative’s top executive called a ‘massive and unprecedented intrusion’ into how news 
organizations gather the news.”).  
 69 See, e.g., Brian Stelter & Michael D. Shear, Justice Dept. Investigated Fox Reporter  
Over Leak, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/us/politics/white-house 
-defends-tracking-fox-reporter.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6QDB-Z2AF (“Without naming 
Mr. Rosen [the reporter being investigated], the document describes the reporter as ‘at the very 
least, either as an aider, abettor and/or co-conspirator.’” (quoting Aff. in Support of Appl. for Search 
Warrant at 27, In re Search of [Redacted], No. 1:10-mj-00291-AK (D.D.C. May 28, 2010), archived 
at http://perma.cc/YB23-4ZEE)).  
 70 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over “state and 
federal authorities . . . attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of 
government”); Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[P]ermitting litigants unrestricted, 
court-enforced access to journalistic resources would risk the symbolic harm of making journalists 
appear to be an investigative arm of the judicial system, the government, or private parties.”). 
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dividual to do the same thing.71  According the government such a 
power could transform journalists into de facto police investigators 
whom prosecutors might summon at any time.  Invocation of this 
power also could dry up valuable sources of information, in part be-
cause effective use of confidential sources often requires development 
of a trust-based relationship over time.72  Similar concerns also arise in 
the civil context.73  These concerns suggest that there is a special case 
to be made for protecting members of the press from subpoenas, 
search warrants, and other intrusions that could burden their news-
gathering and reporting efforts. 
We can never really know, of course, what information the public 
never received because of an absence of newsgathering protection.  
But we do know that without press protections, journalists were una-
ble to get information about detainees at Guantanamo Bay74 or gain 
access to a jail where there were reports of cruel conditions and an 
inmate suicide.75  We know that reporters have gone to jail for refusing 
to reveal their sources76 and risk liability if they engage in undercover 
reporting.77  A failure to protect newsgathering by the press not only 
causes harm to those particular speakers but also imposes a shared 
cost.  Treating the press like all other speakers obstructs the public’s 
right to know and impedes an important check on the government.  
Concluding that the Press Clause has meaning independent of that 
of the Speech Clause and that it is possible to identify press speakers 
are the preliminary tasks.  Accomplishing those tasks will allow us to 
move on to the debate over what types of press rights and protections 
make sense. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 71 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728–36 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (outlining harm of subjecting jour-
nalists to unrestricted subpoena power). 
 72 See id. at 729 (noting that “the promise of confidentiality may be a necessary prerequisite to a 
productive relationship between a newsman and his informants” because they “may be willing to 
relate that information only in confidence to a reporter whom [they] trust[]”). 
 73 See Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35 (explaining the concern that if the press had no protection against 
civil subpoenas, “[t]he resulting wholesale exposure of press files to litigant scrutiny would burden the 
press with heavy costs of subpoena compliance, and could otherwise impair its ability to perform its 
duties — particularly if potential sources were deterred from speaking to the press, or insisted on re-
maining anonymous, because of the likelihood that they would be sucked into litigation”). 
 74 See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 279 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 75 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1978). 
 76 See Paying the Price: A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, 
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/jailed 
-journalists (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XQ6F-PJVZ. 
 77 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that journalists who lied on employment applications to gain access to private facilities or used 
secret cameras for newsgathering activities are not protected by the First Amendment and may be 
liable for trespass or other offenses).  
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II.  DOES CHANGING TECHNOLOGY CHANGE THE PRESS? 
Finding the press in a sea of sundry speakers is not without its 
complications.  Advances in communication technology that make it 
simpler and cheaper to share information widely are escalating the 
challenge.  This section considers the impact of this new technology on 
the search for the press and concludes that it helps, not hinders, the 
quest by focusing our attention on the unique functions of the press 
and by reducing concerns of elitism. 
A.  Technology Focuses the Search for the Press 
It is now easier than ever for the occasional public commentator to 
act at times as a casual journalist.  The Supreme Court has observed 
that thanks to “the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and 
broadcast media . . . the line between the media and others who wish 
to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”78  
These technological developments suggest to some that our view of the 
press should be expanding with no less rapidity than technological 
change.79 
There is a tendency to throw up one’s hands in contemplating the 
impact of new technologies on the Press Clause.  The Court, after all, 
has long had an uneasy relationship with the Clause, and new technol-
ogies seem to render claims for invigorating it messier than ever be-
fore.  Yet the age of the Internet, bloggers, smartphones, and social  
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 78 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905–06 (2010).  
 79 See id.; see also SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW 6 (2007) (“Although we are 
not all engaged in the practice of journalism, anyone of us can be if we want to [due in part to tech-
nological advances].  In that respect, we’re all journalists now.”); David A. Anderson, Freedom of 
the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 528 (2002) (“[I]t is difficult to distinguish the press from the rest be-
cause the press is ‘disappearing inside the larger world of communications.’” (quoting KOVACH & 
ROSENSTIEL, supra note 57, at 11)); W. Lance Bennett, The Twilight of Mass Media News: Mar-
kets, Citizenship, Technology, and the Future of Journalism, in FREEING THE PRESSES 111, 112 
(Timothy E. Cook ed., 2005) (“Today, anyone with a computer or a mobile phone is a potential re-
porter and publisher.”); Cohen, supra note 64, at 3 (describing the rise of “an Internet-based Fifth 
Estate” where “anyone with a computer and Internet access can produce and disseminate news”); 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 
519–20 (2007) (arguing that a qualified testimonial privilege “should extend to any-
one . . . disseminating information to the public,” id. at 520); Keith Werhan, Essay, Rethinking 
Freedom of the Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1601 n.243 (2008) (favoring a definition of 
the press that includes “anyone who regularly gathers and disseminates information of public inter-
est to the public”).  But see West, supra note 23, at 1056–58 (explaining why a broad definition of the 
press leads to less robust protection of constitutional rights); but cf. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 5 (citing 
concern that expansive media access would “undermine jail security”); Hamburger, supra note 49, 
at 838 (noting concerns “that an enlarged definition of any right may invite limitations on the cir-
cumstances in which it is available”). 
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media is an especially good time to tackle this issue.  Advances in mass 
communication might blur the lines between the press and everyone 
else, but they also offer an incentive to pinpoint with heightened speci-
ficity the distinctive functions the press performs in our democracy.  
Better understanding of those functions, in turn, helps to frame rules — 
including rules that reach beyond the Speech Clause — that ensure 
that those functions are carried out. 
There was a time, for example, when how speakers communicated 
was a convenient proxy for who is and who is not the press, but that 
time is no longer.80  In the past, identifiers such as affiliation with an 
established news organization or use of traditional media — television, 
radio, or newspapers — were relatively precise indicators.  Nonpress 
speakers rarely had access to these modes of communication, and press 
speakers had no alternatives for reaching mass audiences.  Today, 
however, nearly every established news media organization has a web 
site and disseminates news via electronic services such as Twitter and 
Facebook.  Increasingly, news publishers provide online services only 
and no longer have print editions,81 while many others are cutting 
back on the amount of content put into print in favor of web-based 
dissemination.82  At the same time, however, hundreds of millions of 
speakers use blogs, social media, and similar means of communicating 
even though they are not functioning as the press.83  The Court itself 
observed that constantly evolving technology meant that any business-
structure or medium-based definition of the press “would likely be 
born an anachronism.”84  An approach that accords press status to ev-
eryone engaged in online communication would fall short of effectively 
identifying only those speakers fulfilling press functions. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 85, 108–20 (1991) (describing past ap-
proaches as “partial regulation,” id. at 116, of the press depending on the medium involved). 
 81 Slate Magazine is one such example. See SLATE, http://www.slate.com (last visited May 10, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8J2U-GYCD. 
 82 See Sarah Frier & Edmund Lee, Newsweek to Become Online-Only After 80 Years in Print, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-18/newsweek-to 
-become-online-only-after-80-years-in-print.html, archived at http://perma.cc/73PT-RBSA (reporting on 
Newsweek’s move to an all-digital publication); Dan Reimold, Revolution in Georgia: Student Newspa-
per Goes Digital First, PBS (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/08/revolution-in 
-georgia-student-newspaper-goes-digital-first230.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QD9Z-MNQZ (de-
scribing University of Georgia’s student newspaper’s move to a primarily online publication). 
 83 See Facebook Reaches Majority of US Web Users, EMARKETER (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www 
.e m a r k e t e r . c o m / % 2 8 S % 2 8 r t 1 5 q 0 e u z f l u p c b j 2 u 1 l k p n p % 2 9 % 2 9 / A r t i c l e / F a c e b o o k - R e a c h e s - M a j o r i t y 
-of-US-Web-Users/1008247, archived at http://perma.cc/457F-C2NT (“By 2013, 62% of web users 
and almost half (47.6%) of the overall US population will be on Facebook.”). 
 84 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 782 (1985); id. at 782 n.7. 
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Modern communication technology makes it evident that a less 
static understanding of the press is needed.  That understanding, 
moreover, should be rooted in what the press actually does.  The ex-
plosion of technology has changed the way everyone creates and re-
ceives information.  But — and this is the key point — it has not elim-
inated the vital functional roles played by the press in our society.  The 
Internet is having the positive effect of focusing attention on the key 
functional criteria of press membership — that is, by directing atten-
tion to assessing who is truly carrying out the role of the press.85 
B.  Embracing Press Exceptionalism but Not Elitism 
New technologies also have diminished the risks of elitism.  One 
longstanding objection to embracing press exceptionalism is that it re-
quires giving special rights to a few, already privileged speakers.86  This 
concern is, at its core, one of speaker-based discrimination.  The worry is 
that only certain types of primarily elite speakers will be considered part 
of the press and, therefore, only certain messages or viewpoints will re-
ceive, as a practical matter, heightened constitutional protections.87 
This concern is valid.  But the concern’s alleviation does not re-
quire that every speaker be considered a member of the press.  The ob-
jective should not be to treat all speakers equally regardless of whether 
they are fulfilling press functions, but rather to ensure equal oppor-
tunity for all speakers to be recognized as the press if deserved.  And 
modern technology helps everyone in this regard by easing the path to 
constitutional press status. 
The case against recognizing unique press rights is often rooted in 
the concept that the Constitution protects fringe speakers and messages 
that depart from the orthodox, sometimes even wildly so.  This near-
absolutist approach that we apply to speech has trained us to bristle at 
the notion of giving anyone “special” First Amendment protections.88 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 See discussion infra section III.A, pp. 2454. 
 86 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) 
(“[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to pro-
tect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it.” (quoting Pennekamp v. 
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation mark omitted)); see also Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a 
Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 413 (1999) (expressing concern that a 
narrow definition creates an “elite, protected class”). 
 87 See Anderson, supra note 79, at 479 (“In the case of the press, the decisions are made by a self-
appointed elite.”); Mike Godwin, Who’s a Journalist? — II: Welcome the New Journalists on the 
Internet, 13 MEDIA STUD. J. 38, 38–39, 42 (1999) (advocating the end of special privileges for the 
established press); West, supra note 23, at 1054–55 (recognizing that some scholars fear and call for 
an end of the elite press). 
 88 Anderson, supra note 79, at 529 (describing this negative view of unique press rights — which 
he does not share — as “the tyranny of a self-appointed elite that depicts the world through its own 
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Yet acknowledging the existence of press speakers who fill particu-
lar functional roles and identifying those who best satisfy those roles is 
not the same as being nonegalitarian.  Developing such distinctions is 
common practice in constitutional law.  In defamation law, for exam-
ple, we divide plaintiffs between public officials,89 public figures,90 and 
nonpublic figures.91  Depending on one’s classification, different con-
stitutional rules apply.  The law thus recognizes that different people 
play different roles in our society.  Distinguishing between press defa-
mation defendants and nonpress defamation defendants would operate 
in a similar way.92 
The functional role provided by the press centers on its role as 
watchdog of the powerful and as conduit of newsworthy information.93  
Identifying those speakers who are best suited to fill these roles, and 
providing them with rights that would help them pursue these en-
deavors, is not elitist.  In fact, it is just the opposite.  The press serves 
as a check on the most elite members of our society — high-ranking 
government officials and private but powerful figures — by gathering 
and supplying the general public with critical information about them. 
The key is making sure that there is equal access to recognition as 
a member of the press.  As long as all speakers can gain the qualifica-
tions of press identification regardless of their message or their identity, 
inequality concerns are unfounded.  In opposing efforts to provide spe-
cial privileges for the press, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that “the 
First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any definable category of per-
sons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.”94  But 
Chief Justice Burger’s line of thinking about the First Amendment 
begs the question because we must ask how we “exercise its freedoms.”   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
filter, tr[ying] to tell people what they need to know, and bedevil[ing] their elected officials and their 
celebrities in the names of their right to know”). 
 89 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public officials to 
prove actual malice to recover for defamation). 
 90 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164–65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) 
(applying “actual malice” test to public figures); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
335–36 (1974) (recognizing that Curtis Publishing extended the “actual malice” rule to public  
figures). 
 91 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–50 (requiring nonpublic plaintiffs to prove at least negligence to 
recover for actual injury when speech relates to a matter of public concern, and to prove actual mal-
ice to recover punitive damages); cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 757–61 (1985) (holding that when defamatory speech does not involve a matter of public con-
cern, a plaintiff can recover without any showing of fault). 
 92 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether press defendants should be treat-
ed differently than nonpress defendants in defamation cases.  See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986). 
 93 See West, supra note 22, at 40–44.  
 94 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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His statement is consistent with an approach to the Press Clause that 
identifies the press as a subset of all speakers.  If Press Clause protec-
tion goes to everyone who is exercising its freedoms in the sense of ful-
filling the functions the Clause is meant to encourage, then it remains 
both an egalitarian and a theoretically consistent provision. 
As with restrictions on speech, the limits imposed by the Press 
Clause must account for the potential for content- or speaker-based 
discrimination.  Concern about such discrimination should take center 
stage, instead of some vague concern about favoring certain “elites.”  
Identifying the press in a way that looks for those members who are 
best fulfilling the unique roles of the press in society leaves ample 
room for minority, nontraditional, and outlying speakers to receive 
Press Clause protection. 
Advances in mass communication technology, meanwhile, have 
opened the gates to press membership wider than ever before.  By 
making it cheaper and easier for all speakers to reach large audiences, 
the Internet has eliminated many barriers to fulfilling press func-
tions.95  No longer must a speaker be affiliated with a formal news or-
ganization or have a broadcast license or access to a printing press to 
effectively function as the press. 
Even with these technological advances, gathering news and pub-
lishing to a mass audience is, of course, not costless.  While more ac-
cessible than ever before, the technology still requires resources, and 
the act of gathering and reporting news takes time that will burden 
some speakers more than others.  Publishing, however, has always had 
its costs, as the Framers well knew.  Colonial-era printing required 
money, labor, and often-scarce supplies.96  Access to information and a 
delivery system were also barriers to printing,97 as were the basics of 
literacy.98  In short, exercising press freedoms has always required spe- 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 Anthony Ciolli, Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 260 (2007) 
(“[A]nybody with a computer, an internet connection, and a cheap or free blogging program can be-
come an amateur journalist and immediately have access to an international audience.”); Jay M. 
Zitter, Annotation, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs and Bloggers, 35 A.L.R.6th 407, 
§ 1 (2008) (“Blogs, short for ‘Web logs,’ are an increasingly popular form of interactive Web sites, 
since an individual can reach a potentially huge audience with a relatively small investment of time 
and energy.”). 
 96 See LAWRENCE C. WROTH, THE COLONIAL PRINTER 233 (1931) (“This high mortality 
among the newspapers can be best accounted for by . . . the difficulty experienced at various times 
and places of securing a steady supply of reasonably cheap paper.”). 
 97 See JOHN CLYDE OSWALD, PRINTING IN THE AMERICAS 30 (1937) (“Most of the printing 
offices were located at the seat of the provincial governments . . . .”). 
 98 See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 31–32 (1977) (dis-
tinguishing between “inert” or technical literacy and “liberating literacy” and using newspaper cir-
culations to suggest an increase in the latter in the eighteenth century).  
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cial investment, talents, and effort.  The idea that some will have an 
easier path to exercising their rights is not a foreign concept to our  
Constitution.99  It should invigorate, rather than diminish, the case for 
legal rights for the press, however, that the costs of gaining press 
membership are drastically decreasing. 
Under the guidelines for identifying the press that I outline in Part 
III below, moving from occasional public commentator to press mem-
ber would require the establishment of diverse criteria.  The paths for 
a speaker to gain recognition as a member of the press are many and 
varied.  A speaker can attain press status through some combination of 
institutional recognition, education, work history, publication record, 
established audience, and possibly other means.  Recognizing this di-
versity of pathways lessens concerns about the monopolization of priv-
ileges by an advantaged elite. 
III.  DEVELOPING A WORKABLE PATH  
FOR FINDING THE PRESS 
Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger has described 
“[t]he definitional problem — who constitutes ‘the press’” as 
“seem[ingly] intractable.”100  I disagree.  The problems posed by defin-
ing “the press” are not qualitatively different than the problems posed 
by defining terms found in other provisions of the Constitution.  It is, 
of course, not necessary that a magic “sorting hat”101 appear before the 
Press Clause can take effect.  As they have done in other areas of the 
law, the courts can and should apply constitutional principles via an 
organizational process that unfolds over time.102 
Many, if not most cases that involve claimed press membership 
would not be hard to resolve.103  But there will be, as always, gray ar- 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 99 See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011) (holding that criminal defendant law-
yer’s failure to introduce any expert evidence did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (upholding parental 
notification requirements for minors seeking abortions despite evidence that such requirements 
place particular burdens on minors and the poor); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per 
curiam) (“[R]estrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”). 
 100 LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A 
NEW CENTURY 53 (2010). 
 101 See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 117 (1999).  
 102 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“All new 
laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature de-
liberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated 
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”). 
 103 See Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autono-
mous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979) (“In the great preponderance of cases, a court has 
little difficulty knowing a journalist when it sees one.”).   
  
2454 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:2434 
eas.  That does not mean that courts should give up on interpretation.  
As Professor Frederick Schauer observed: “[C]ategorization is the only 
way in which we can organize and negotiate an overwhelming world 
whose vast array of particulars demands that it be sorted into  
categories.”104 
A.  The Press Is as the Press Does 
The primary goal in our search for the press is to identify those 
speakers who are fulfilling particular constitutional functions.  Thus, 
distinguishing the press from the occasional public commentator re-
quires asking whether the speaker is carrying out the unique roles of 
the press.  Focusing on the functional roles is both constitutionally 
based and allows for standards to adapt over time. 
Many scholarly105 and legislative106 attempts to define the press 
have adopted a functional approach.107  The problem is that these def-
initions tend to be overinclusive by embracing a broad view of the 
press as encompassing anyone who gathers or disseminates infor-
mation to the public.
108
  Or, if they try to pinpoint press activities more 
specifically, they risk being underinclusive and overlooking alternative 
journalists by mirroring too heavily the actions of the traditional  
media.109 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 104 Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1747, 1748 (2007). 
 105 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 
754, 829 (1999) (advocating a “purpose-oriented definition”); Paul Horwitz, Or of the [Blog], 11 
NEXUS 45, 52 (2006) (“The medium by which [blog-based] journalism is disseminated to the public 
matters far less than the fact that an individual has deliberately gathered and disseminated news-
worthy facts.”); Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privi-
lege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979) (“[A]ll citizens exercising the 
press function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed by the ‘institutional press,’ war-
rant [constitutional] protection.”); Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why 
Does It Matter? Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241, 
247 (2007) (identifying the “egalitarian” definition of the press “in which all citizens are equally 
equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering watchdogs”). 
 106 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2012) (protecting any “person who is or has been directly 
engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information for the pur-
pose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(1) 
(2013) (protecting “[a]ny person . . . engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, 
photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news medium”).  
 107 See also Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding a filmmaker 
was not the press for reporter’s privilege purposes because he was not functioning as the press “in its 
valuable public service of seeking out and revealing truthful information”). 
 108 See, e.g., Werhan, supra note 79, at 1601 n.243 (favoring a definition of the press that includes 
“anyone who regularly gathers and disseminates information of public interest to the public”). 
 109 See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 79, at 583 (arguing that some functional criteria could overly 
favor the traditional mainstream media). 
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I propose instead that we look to the Supreme Court to determine 
the constitutional roles of the press.  In another piece, I concluded that 
the Court in its opinions has pinpointed two unique functions of the  
press.110  These are to act as surrogates for and conduits of news to the 
public, and to serve as a check on the government and the powerful.111  
The goal is to recognize protections for those who are most effectively 
fulfilling these roles in our society. 
B.  Hosanna-Tabor: A Helpful Model 
The Supreme Court recently provided a helpful model demonstrat-
ing how to identify a group of distinct constitutional rightsholders in 
its unanimous 2012 decision,112 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC.113  In that case, the Court was tasked 
with deciding whether a parochial school teacher was a “minister” for 
purposes of the “ministerial exception” to certain employment discrim-
ination laws that derives from the Free Exercise Clause.114 
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor was focused on a different First 
Amendment provision, of course, but its analysis promises to have 
broad and significant implications.115  By holding that certain religious 
actors may claim First Amendment protections that other individuals 
and organizations may not, the Court embraced the concept that sub-
sets of constitutional actors exist and can be identified.  The relevance 
of the case to the search for the press is clear: the Court needed to and 
was able to distinguish those who were functioning with a protected 
constitutional purpose from those who were in a similar position but 
did not merit constitutional protection. 
As I am proposing here, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor emphasized a 
functional inquiry.  The Court examined the teacher’s actions for signs 
that she was discharging the “important religious functions”116 of a 
minister.  It was not necessary, the Court held, that the teacher “per-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 110 West, supra note 22. 
 111 Id.  
 112 All nine Justices joined the majority opinion of Hosanna-Tabor, but Justices Thomas and 
Alito wrote separate concurrences, and Justice Kagan joined the latter concurrence.  
 113 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).   
 114 Id. at 699.    
 115 See Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 
836–37 (2012) (suggesting that it “may be the broader doctrinal implications of Hosanna-Tabor that 
have the most lasting significance,” id. at 837); Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) 
(calling the decision a “jurisprudential earthquake” whose “biggest aftershock has yet to be felt”). 
 116 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708; see also id. at 714–15 (noting that the teacher taught scrip-
ture to her students, led daily prayer and devotional exercises, and occasionally led a school-wide 
religious service, which included “choosing liturgies, hymns, and readings, and composing and de-
livering a message based on Scripture,” id. at 715). 
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form exclusively religious functions,”117 and while the amount of time 
she spent on religious activities was “relevant,” it was not alone  
determinative.118 
Equally remarkable in Hosanna-Tabor is what the Court did not 
do.  The Court did not conclude that the lack of a precise definition of 
“minister”119 should deter it from dealing with a conflict between gen-
erally applicable employment discrimination laws and “the text of the 
First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of 
religious organizations.”120  The Court further did not feel compelled 
to draft an all-encompassing definition that would satisfy every con-
ceivable hypothetical situation, stating instead that it was “reluc-
tant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee quali-
fies as a minister.”121  The Court freed itself to proceed slowly on a 
case-by-case basis, declaring that “[i]t is enough for us to conclude” 
that the teacher in this case satisfied the exception.122 
In its analysis, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not purport to cre-
ate any official test or formal elements of a legal definition.  The 
Court’s discussion instead highlighted certain attributes about the 
teacher involved in that case.  No single factor appeared to be deci-
sive.  My proposal below envisions much the same approach for iden-
tifying the press. 
C.  Guidelines for Identifying the Press 
This section draws from the Hosanna-Tabor factors, as well as in-
sights from past attempts by legislatures to define the press,123 in order 
to identify reliable proxies and signals that will lead the courts to those 
speakers who best fulfill the unique constitutional functions of the 
press.124  My analysis suggests that the following considerations are of 
the greatest importance: (1) recognition by others as the press; (2) hold-
ing oneself out as the press; (3) training, education, or experience in 
journalism; and (4) regularity of publication and established audience. 
1.  Recognition as the Press. — In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court relied 
on the fact that the church recognized the teacher “as a minister, with 
a role distinct from that of most of its members.”125  The Court point-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 Id. at 708 (quoting Brief for Federal Respondent at 51, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 708 (No. 
10-553)). 
 118 Id. at 709. 
 119 See id. at 707. 
 120 Id. at 706.  
 121 Id. at 707.  
 122 Id.  
 123 See West, supra note 23, at 1062–68 (examining legislative definitions of the press). 
 124 Cf. generally Robinson, supra note 115 (offering a purposivist framework for defining a “reli-
gious institution” after Hosanna-Tabor). 
 125 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
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ed to a title she had been given as a “called” as opposed to a “lay”  
teacher126 and noted that the church referred to her as a “commis-
sioned minister.”127  The teacher’s job description included “ministerial  
responsibilities” and the requirement that she continue her education 
as a professional in the ministry.
128
  In other words, the Court’s analysis 
suggests that we know she is likely a minister because the church la-
beled her one. 
A similar approach to the press would go a long way (although not 
all the way) toward separating speakers who merit constitutional des-
ignation as press members from occasional public commentators.  Em-
ployment by a news organization with a job description or title of “re-
porter,” “editor,” “photojournalist,” or the like would signal a level of 
seriousness that corresponds with the Press Clause’s goals.  Member-
ship in professional organizations would also be informative, as would 
an award of press credentials by a governmental entity or private  
organization. 
There is no doubt that tying press membership to affiliations with 
a media company or press credentials would leave out some important 
speakers who are fulfilling press functions.  That does not mean, how-
ever, that these traditional indicators of press membership are without 
value.  News organizations, professional journalism societies, and 
groups that offer various types of press credentials reflect public norms 
regarding which speakers best fulfill the functions of the press.129  In 
addition, these organizations do not operate in the shadows.  They are 
accountable to the public, self-regulating, self-correcting, and sensitive 
about adapting to changing times.130  In other words, these organiza-
tions can do much of the heavy lifting in singling out press members, 
and it would be imprudent to ignore them. 
Institutional theorists suggest that societies should be left to build 
institutions as they see fit, and the courts should then look to those in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 Id. at 699. 
 127 Id. at 708. 
 128 Id. at 707. 
 129 See Lacy et al., supra note 58, at 34, 42 (“[D]ata indicate that citizen journalism Web sites 
(news and blog sites) are generally not acceptable substitutes for daily newspaper Web sites.”); Pew 
Research Center’s Journalism Project Staff, How News Happens: A Study of the News Ecosys-
tem of One American City, PEW RES. JOURNALISM PROJECT (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www 
.journalism.org/2010/01/11/how-news-happens, archived at http://perma.cc/D57P-KDAS (discuss-
ing an empirical study of Baltimore’s “news ecosystem” and noting that “of the stories that did con-
tain new information nearly all, 95%, came from traditional media — most of them newspapers”). 
 130 See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) 
(“The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own . . . views is bounded by only two 
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers — and hence advertisers — to assure 
financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.”). 
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stitutions as guides in interpreting the law.131  The Court has not here-
tofore taken this approach.  Indeed, Schauer has argued that “the re-
fusal of the Supreme Court to treat the press as different despite its 
identifiably distinct institutional status is part of a larger pattern of 
treating First Amendment doctrine as institutionally blind.”132 
Relying on third-party recognition of the press would allow us to 
capitalize in a commonsense fashion on information gleaned in the real 
world.  It is noteworthy that journalism has developed into a recog-
nized profession organized in part around professional societies, cre-
dentialing systems, and formally structured news organizations.  These 
institutions of working journalists have developed practical under-
standings as to who is and who is not functioning as the press.133  In 
fact, the press might be one of the most natural places to rely on the 
structural guidelines that already exist.134  The press as an institution, 
according to Professor Paul Horwitz, “is identifiable and long estab-
lished; it is a major part of the infrastructure of public discourse; it fol-
lows its own norms, practices, and self-regulatory standards; and it is 
fully (if imperfectly) capable of acting autonomously.”135  Thus, by cre-
dentialing, hiring, conferring degrees upon, or in other ways recogniz-
ing individuals as the press, journalistic institutions give us important 
cues regarding who is serving the core purposes of the press. 
They also, however, raise concerns of favoring certain speakers 
over others.  Nontraditional news sources run the risk of being left out 
even as they are operating to fulfill press functions.  Guidelines estab-
lished by professional organizations may be skewed in a manner that 
burdens particular messages or viewpoints to a greater degree than 
would rules forged by detached and politically insulated courts. 
A look to press institutions, therefore, can begin — but must not 
end — the inquiry.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 131 See Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 87 (2009) (asserting that an institutionally sensitive approach “under-
stand[s] that some speech institutions are key contributors to our system of public discourse and 
that ‘the freedom of expression is not only enjoyed by and through, but also depends on the exist-
ence and flourishing of,’ these institutions” (quoting Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? To-
wards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008))).  
 132 Schauer, supra note 104, at 1754.  But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press 
Clause confers upon the ‘institutional press’ any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by 
all others.”). 
 133 HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 165 (stating that courts should “focus on whether a given entity 
was a journalistic entity engaging in the act of journalism, subject to the norms, traditions, and self-
regulating practices that characterize the press”). 
 134 See Horwitz, supra note 105, at 58 (“If we think of the First Amendment in institutional 
terms, the Press Clause is obviously the most natural, most textually rooted place to find some form 
of institutional autonomy for what we might label the conventional working press.”). 
 135 HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 146. 
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2.  Identification as the Press. — In addition to looking to third-
party recognition of the press, courts can also take note of whether the 
speaker has identified himself as the press.  In Hosanna-Tabor, the 
Court looked to evidence that the teacher had “held herself out as a 
minister of the Church” by claiming special privileges and making a 
statement referring to herself as a minister.136  Regardless of affiliation 
with or recognition by a news organization, evidence that a speaker 
claims a role as the press would be instructive (although rarely deci-
sive), and would lessen the risk of an overly elitist definition. 
Relying solely on self-identification as the press would, of course, 
allow too many occasional public commentators to label themselves as 
the press.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized: “[S]elf-
appointed journalists or entities with little track record who claim the 
[reporter’s] privilege require more scrutiny.”137 
Nonetheless, as with the self-titled minister in Hosanna-Tabor, evi-
dence that a speaker has self-identified as the press does provide some 
useful information regarding possible press membership.  An estab-
lished history of holding oneself out as a member of the press might 
provide insight into the speaker’s intentions.138  Similarly, it could re-
veal whether others presumed the speaker was a member of the press 
and relied on that representation.139  Acknowledging a proven history 
of self-identification as the press would leave open the possibility for 
many speakers to earn a designation as the press while also weeding 
out those who might claim the title sporadically or pretextually.140 
3.  Training, Education, or Experience. — In Hosanna-Tabor, the 
Court also pointed to the teacher’s religious training and continuing 
education as a minister.141  These factors would also be helpful for 
identifying the press.  Many members of the press today have studied 
journalism formally, have been trained as part of a mentorship, or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 136 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012); id. 
at 708. 
 137 Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 383 (N.J. 2011). 
 138 See Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying the press privilege to 
someone who did not have the intent to publish the information she was collecting at the time she 
collected the information, stating, “the talisman invoking the journalist’s privilege is intent to dis-
seminate to the public at the time the gathering of information commences”). 
 139 Reporters are frequently denied the protections of the privilege if they conceal the fact that 
they are a reporter from their source.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21a(h) (West 2012) (“‘In 
the course of pursuing his professional activities’ . . . does not include any situation in which a re-
porter intentionally conceals from the source the fact that he is a reporter . . . .”). 
 140 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Although Madden proclaims himself to 
be ‘Pro Wrestling’s only real journalist,’ hyperbolic self-proclamation will not suffice as proof that 
an individual is a journalist.”). 
 141 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
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have built a history of experience through independent journalistic  
activity.142 
There is some overlap here with other factors.  When a journalism 
school educates a student and confers a degree in “journalism,” it is 
providing institutional identification of a speaker as the press.143  So 
too with the speaker who has been hired, trained, or mentored by an 
established news organization.  Likewise, a speaker who has a track 
record of experience in journalistic activity also can show that she has 
been functioning as the press and perhaps can point to regularity of 
publication and an established audience.144 
4.  Regularity of Publication or Established Audience. — Finally, 
courts should consider the regularity of publication or a showing of an 
established readership.145  Some legislative approaches take these fac-
tors into account.  The journalist shield laws in both Indiana and Illi-
nois, for example, cover those who publish “at regular intervals” and 
have “a general circulation.”146 
Examining how often a speaker publishes and to whom the publi-
cation is directed is helpful in identifying the press for several reasons.  
First, and most importantly, the factors of publication and circulation 
record relate closely with the unique functions of the press qua press.  
Of particular importance, effectively disseminating news to the public 
requires actually reaching the public.  Speakers likewise cannot be said 
to impose a check on either government or powerful nongovernmental 
figures if the conversation occurs in a vacuum. 
A proven track record of publication similarly correlates with de-
voting time and resources to informing the public and scrutinizing the 
powerful.  An isolated or sporadic publication might further these 
functions, but at best it does so marginally.  It is those speakers who 
return to the marketplace of news again and again who best serve the 
roles of a rigorous and vigilant press.  Thus, regularly communicating 
with a broad audience is a necessary, although not always sufficient, 
qualification to fulfill the press’s informing and checking functions.   
Regularity of publication is a useful device for separating the press  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 142 See Ide & Vashisht, supra note 61 (quoting David Boardman, managing editor of The Seattle 
Times and president of Investigative Reporters and Editors, the nation’s foremost organization de-
voted to investigative reporting, who stated: “To do good investigative journalism, you need train-
ing, and a lot of these are sophisticated skills that if there’s nobody to teach it, nobody will know 
how to do it”). 
 143 See supra section III.C.1, pp. 2456–58. 
 144 See infra section III.C.4, pp. 2460–62. 
 145 See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the 
Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1411–12 (2003) 
(defining journalism in part by asking whether information is “regularly disseminated,” id. at 1412). 
 146 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.  5/8-902(B) (2012); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1(1)(A) (2013). 
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from occasional public commentators who act sporadically in a press-
like manner but who are not repeat players committing time and re-
sources to press functions.147 
 Second, regularity of publication and the existence of an established 
audience ensure accountability for the press.  The Court has recog-
nized that one of the only limits on the press is “the acceptance of a 
sufficient number of readers — and hence advertisers — to assure fi-
nancial success.”148  Without the demands of regular readers, we lose 
an important check on the press.  Those speakers who publish regular-
ly and have a following also can more readily correct errors, follow up 
on stories, and provide context across topics.  Any potential risks of 
recognizing constitutional rights and privileges of the press are less-
ened by the responsibility that comes with having a reputation built on 
a publication record and answering to an established readership. 
Third, an established publication track record and substantial cir-
culation helps to weed out pretextual claims.  The objective is to sepa-
rate those speakers opportunistically claiming to be the press while 
avoiding an approach that favors only the elite.  An inquiry into the 
publication record and the scope of an audience addresses these con-
cerns.  A speaker who is pretextually asserting press status in order to 
claim, for example, a right of access or testimonial privilege would al-
most always be unable to show a consistent publication record or a fol-
lowing by a meaningful audience.  A publication record reflects a ded-
ication to distribution of the news that almost by definition is not a 
quality of the occasional public commentator. 
Finally, using regularity of publication and established readership 
as a means to find the press also addresses concerns of elitism.  As we 
have seen, advances in mass communication technology have made it 
easier and cheaper for most speakers to publish to a broad audience.149  
The explosion of bloggers exemplifies this phenomenon.  While not all 
bloggers function as the press, those who do often provide valuable 
vantage points that differ from the traditional media.  Any constitu-
tional recognition of the press needs to embrace these diverse speakers 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 147 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4)(a) (2013) (specifying that to be a “reporter” for the 
purposes of the state’s reporter’s privilege law, one must “earn[] his or her principal livelihood by, or 
in each of the preceding 3 weeks or 4 of the preceding 8 weeks [have] spent at least 20 hours engaged 
in the practice of, obtaining or preparing information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for 
the mass reproduction of words, sounds, or images in a form available to the general public”).  For 
membership purposes, the Society of Professional Journalists considers anyone who spends more 
than half of their time working as a journalist or journalism educator to be a “professional journal-
ist.”  Become an SPJ Member, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/whyjoin5 
.asp (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E4JX-DYLU. 
 148 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); accord Mi-
ami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974). 
 149 See supra section II.A, pp. 2448–50. 
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equally with those representing more mainstream approaches.  Giving 
attention to the speaker’s publication record and the expansiveness of 
an audience serves this goal. 
Under the methodology proposed here, virtually anyone can be-
come a member of the press.  At the same time, not everyone with a 
smartphone or laptop will make the cut.  Being a member of the press 
is a role that no speaker is born into and few can attain overnight; ra-
ther, such membership comes with the exertion of effort over time.  
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor signaled a similar view as to attaining 
the status of “minister.”  By relying on experience, training, and past 
identification as a minister, the Justices indicated comfort with a 
framework that emphasizes past activities to establish a place in a con-
stitutional category.  While the focus is on function, examination of ex-
ternal cues guides the way.  Someone with no training or experience 
who does not regularly connect with a congregation is not likely to be 
much of a minister.  By the same token, according press rights to neo-
phytes and dabblers will do little to further the functional goals the 
Press Clause was meant to serve. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
With the explosion of technology, we all now have at our fingertips 
the power to convey information broadly.  This newfound ability to 
speak with each other is immensely valuable, which is why the Speech 
Clause protects it so robustly.  Yet it does not make us all the press for 
Press Clause purposes.  This is why the time has come to embrace 
press exceptionalism.  Acknowledging that there are certain speakers 
who are most effectively fulfilling valuable roles in our democracy cre-
ates an opportunity to give needed meaning to the First Amendment’s 
Press Clause. 
It is neither elitist nor discriminatory to separate the press from 
other types of speakers.  Our equality principles are satisfied as long as 
we ensure that all speakers have a fair opportunity to attain this sta-
tus.  Technological developments are advancing, rather than inhibit-
ing, this goal by opening up increasingly more paths for nontraditional 
speakers to function as the press. 
Accepting that it is a subset of speakers, and not everyone, who is 
consistently and effectively playing these functional roles is the first 
step.  The second step is to have the confidence that we can identify 
these special speakers with sufficient (albeit not perfect) specificity.  
Analyzing the role of “minister” in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court showed 
us how to take a holistic approach that focuses on unique functions 
and relies on valuable cues provided by third parties and public insti-
tutions as proxies. 
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At times it might feel as if we are all now not just speakers but also 
the press.  We are not, and we should embrace this distinction.  Ulti-
mately, everyone benefits by properly protecting those few who truly 
are fulfilling this unique and constitutionally recognized role. 
 
 
 
